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RECENT CASES.
CARRIERS OF GOODs-Loss THROUGH ACT oF GOD-PREVIOUS NEGLIGENCE.-
EMPIRE STATE CATTLE Co. v. ATCHINSON, T. & S. F. RY. Co., 135 FED. 136.
Property was negligently delayed in transportation. But for this delay it
would not have been subjected to a subsequent danger in which it was totally
destroyed, which danger was occasioned by an act of God, reasonably unfor-
seen.-Held, that the negligent delay was not the proximate cause of the injury.
The negligence must be the proximate cause of the loss. Scott v. Balti-
more, C. & -?. S. Co., ig Fed. s6. The Federal courts have been constant in
upholding this doctrine since the Supreme Court first laid it down in By. Co.
v. Reeves, 77 U. S. 176 (1869). See also Lamont v. Nashville &- C. R. Co.,
56 Tenn. 58; Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., ui5 Mass. 304. Other courts,
for reasons which seem very plausible, have failed to agree with the above.
Michaels v. N. Y. Central Ry. Co., 3o N. Y. 564; Mfeyer v. Vicksburg, R.
Co., 41 La. Ann. 639. Especially do the courts so hold where the delay
amounts to a violation of contract. Cassiday v. Young, 43 Ky. 265; Denison
v. N. Y. Central Ry. Co., 3 Lans. 265. And where the delay was caused by
carrying the goods out of the usual and direct route. Merchants Deskatch Co.
v. Kahn, 76 Ill. 52o. The Federal courts have sustained their position where
the destruction resulted during the continuance of the negligent delay. Thomas
v.Lancaster Mills, 71 Fed. 481. The contrary is held inHernsheim v. New-
port News Co., 35 S. W. ixIS; Meyer v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., supra.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-
STATE V. SEAGRAVES, 85 S. W. (Mo.). 925.-Held, that carrying passengers on
a steamboat is not interstate commerce, although the boat may touch the shores
of different states.
Where the real destination of stock was a yard across the boundary of the
state, it was held that its carriage did not constitute interstate commerce.
Moore v. Moore, 41 Mo. App. X76; Scammon v. By. Co., 41 Mo. App. 194. It
has been held that goods whose points of departure and destination are in the
same state, though passing through an adjoining state in their transit, are not
in interstate commerce, Seawall v. Ry. Co., 119 Mo. 222; but this
resulted from a misunderstanding of Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Penn., 145 U. S.
192, and is now settled contra. Hanley v. Ry. Co., x87 U. S. 617. And where
commerce is carried by way of the high seas, though from one port in a state
to another in the same state, it is under federal control. Lord v. S. S. Co.,
102 U. S. 541. But see N. 0. Exch. v. Ry. Co., 2 It. Com. R. 375; State v.
Ry. Co., 41 N. W. (Minn.) 1047.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POwER-EXTRA BURDENS ON MERCHANTS
USING TRADING STAMPS.-MONTGOMERY V. KELLY, 38 So. 67 (ALA.).-A city
ordinance required merchants giving trading stamps to pay a license in addi-
tion to that required of other merchants engaged in the same line of business,
but not giving trading stamps. Held, that the ordinance was an attempt,
under the guise of a license tax, to fix a penalty on a merchant for conducting
his business in a certain way, and was therefore unconstitutional under the
"life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" clause, and also under the clause "to
protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property."
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This case is unique as are most of the cases under this rapidly growing
subject. The police power embraces the protection of the lives, health and
property of the citizens, the maintenance of the good order and quiet of the
community, and the preservation of the public morals. Beer Co. v. Mass.,
97 U. S. 25; Thorfie v. -?. Co., 27 Vt. 149. Of course it must be used as a
police power and not as a pretext to avoid unconstitutionality. R. Co. v.
Hobohen, 41 N. J. L. 71; Mayor v. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 26x. As to what does
not lie in the police power, it is easier to distinguish the separate cases as they
arise than to formulate a general rule. For example, a grant to registered
pharmacists of the right to sell patent or proprietary medicines, without requir-
ing them to make any inspection or examination of the same, but denying
such right to.other persons or firms, is unconstitutional. Noel v. Peofile, x88
Ili. 587.
C0EPORATIoNs-MUNIcIPAL-DEFzcTIvE SIDEWALK-CONSTRUcTIVE NOTICE.
-CITY OF OTTA-vA v. HAYNE, 73 N. E. 384 (ILL.).-Held, that in an action
against a city for injuries caused by an obstructed sidewalk, plaintiff may
show by a watchman employed by private persons that the obstruction was
observed by him, in order to prove constructive notice to the city.
The acts and declarations of private persons as to the unsafe condition of
a sidewalk are admissible to show notoriety. Chase v. Lowell, 151 Mass. 422;
McGrail v,. Kalamazoo, 94 Mich. 52. But in Hinckley v. Somerset, 145 Mass.
326, it is held that a conversation between a person previously injured at the
same place and others, not officers of the town, is inadmissible. In showing
constructive notice of defect, the distance from the city hall may be proved.
Masten v. Troy, 5o Hun 485. The fact that no repairs have been made on
the walk for a long time is also competent evidence on this point. Alberts v.
Vernon, 96 Mich. 549. It must appear, however, that the city had reason to
anticipate the defect. Stellwagen v. Winona, 54 Minn. 46o; Lincoln z,.
Pirner, 59 Neb. 634. A municipality may be charged with constructive notice
even though the fact of the defect has not become notorious. Pom/rey v.
Saratoga S!irings, 104 N. Y. 459; Anderson v. Albion, 64 Neb. 280.
CORPORATIONS-MUNICIPAL-ExcAvATIONS OF STREETS-LATERAL SUPPORT.
-DAMICOEHLER V. MILWAUKEE, ioz N. W. 705 (Ws.).-Held, that where a city
negligently excavates a street so as to take away the lateral support of an ad-
joining lot, thereby causing the soil to fall in, it is liable to the owner of the lot
for such injury.
It has been held that there is no liability on the part of a city for taking
away lateral support so as to injure an abutting owner, for it is not a taking of
private property for public use. Rome v. Omberg, 28 Ga. 46. Other cases
hold that a city is liable to the same extent as an individual. Stearnes v.
Richmond, 88 Va. 992; Nichols v. Duluth, 4o Minn. 389. The true rule seems
to be that the city is not liable when it makes the excavations with ordinary
skill and care. Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231; but is liable if it takes away the
support negligently, thereby causing an injury to the adjoining owner, Parke
vz. Seattle, 5 Wash. I; the test of the city's liability being the manner in which
it does the work. Wright v. Wilmington, 92 N. C. x56.
CORPORTIONS-PRivATE-AGREEMENT TO SUBSCRIBE FOR STOCK.-WooDS
MOTOR VEHICLE CO. v. BRADY, 73 N. E. 674 (N. Y.).-The defendant sub-
scribed to the stock of a corporation to be organized to " deal" in automo-
biles. A corporation was subsequently organized for the purpose of
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"manufacturing, leasing, purchasing and selling automobiles" and other
vehicles. Held, that the subscription was not enforceable by such corpora-
tion, where the defendant was not one of the incorporators and refused to pay
his subscription, and did not subscribe for the stock, nor in any way ratify
the subscription agreement. Gray, Bartlett and Haigh, JJ., dissenting.
Under conditions similar to those in this case, some courts have held that
any change is sufficient to release a man from his agreement to subscribe,
because he has the right to say non haec in foedera veni Zabriski V. Ry.
Co., I8 N. J. Eq. 178; Central Ry. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582. Or as
expressed in U. L. &- C. v. 7bwne, I N. H. 44, an assent to amendments
extending the objects, increasing the powers, or enlarging the liabilites of the
corporation is not to be presumed, but must be expressly shown. But the
general view is that the change must be material, radical or fundamental.
Haskell v. Worthington, 94.Mo. 560; M. T. Corb. v. Swan, 1o Mass. 384.
Thus a mere change of name does not release the subscriber. Glenn v.
S.rings, 26 Fed. 238. But he is released if the change effects the identity of
the stock. James v. C. H. S- D. R. Co., 2 Dis. (0.) 261. So a corporation
formed for the "purpose of producing electricity and power," cannot main-
tain an action on a subscription to a corporation to be formed "for the
purpose of furnishing the incandescent system of electric lighting." M. E.
L. &' P. Co. v. Johnson, io9 Cal. 192.
EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL LAw-LETTER FROM ACCUSED TO WIFR.-HAMMONS
V. STATE, 84 S. W. 718 (AR.).-Held, that a letter from the accused to his
wife, intercepted and never delivered to her, is admissible. Battle and
McCulloch, JJ., dissenting.
Whatever has come to the knowledge of either husband or wife by
means of the confidence inspired by the marriage relation cannot afterwards
be divulged in testimony, even if the other party be dead. I GreenL., Ev.,
§§ 254, 334, 337; Jacobs v. Hesler, 113 Mass. 157; Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6
East 188. But a private conversation between husband and wife, who
thought no one overheard them, may be testified to by a concealed listener.
Cam. v. Grifn, iio Mass. i8i; State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378. There is some
conflict among authorities as to whether or not letters between husband and
wife, found in the possession of a third party, are admissible in evidence
against either. The better rule would seem to be that such letters in the
hands of a third person, no matter how he obtained them, are not privileged,
but may be admitted in evidence. Wharton, Crim. E'., § 398; Corn. v.
Cafioni', 55 Mass. 534; State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. ixO. But see contra, x
GreenL., Ev., § 254 a; Reg. v. Pamenter, 12 Cox Cr. Cas. 177; Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 80 Tex. xoI.
EVIDENCE-DECLARATION OF -AGENT.-CAMPBELL v. EMsLE, 91 N. Y.
SUPP. xo69.-Held, that the declarations of an agent may be admissible in
evidence though not made during the continuance of the agency or in regard
to a transaction pending at the time. Hatch and Laughlin, JJ., dissenting.
Admissions, to be admissible, must have been made by the agent while
acting within the real or apparent scope of authority, Charter v. Lane, 62.
Conn. 121; Thill v. Perhins, 63 Conn. 478; during the continuance of the
agency, Cooley v. Norton, 4 Cush. 93; Dean v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 62 N. Y.
642; in regard to a transaction pending at the very time. Rockwell v.
Taylor, 41 Conn. 59; Blanchard v. Blackstone, 102 Mass. 343. Admissions
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by general agents as to past transactions are admissible. McGenness v.
Adriatic Mills, 116 Mass. 177; Ins. Co. v. Woodruff, 26 N. J. L. 54x.
Contra, Smith v. N. C. R. Co., 68 N. Car. 107; Randall v. NorthweVtern
Tel. Co., 54 Wis. 140.
EVIDENCE-DocuMENTS-SUPPRESSION-INFERENCE.-STOUT v. SANDS, 49
S. E. 428 (W. VA.).-Held, that when afrimafacie case is made, and doubt
is cast upon it by rebuttal evidence, suppression of a document relied upon
as evidence by the opposite party raises a strong inference against the party
failing to produce it, and determines the point in favor of the other party.
No inference would arise when the document would not be admissible
without the opponent's consent. Merwin v. Ward, 15 Conn. 377;- Carter v.
Troy Lumber Co., 138 Ill. 533. The inference is allowable only after notice
to produce the document has been given before trial, Emerson v. Fisk, 6
Greenl. 29o; Tobin v. Shaw, 45 Me. 331; and some secondary evidence of the
contents of the document has been given. Cross v. Bell, 34 N. H. 82: Jack-
son v. Johns, i8 Johns. 331. Contra, Runkle v. Burnham, 153 U. S. 216;
Crescent Co. v,. Ermann, 36 La. 841.
EVIDENCE-PERSONAL INJURiEs-SIz OF FAmILY.-ST. Louis, I. M. & S.
Ry. Co. v. ADAMS, 85 S. W. 768. (ARK.).-In an action for personal injuries
plaintiff was permitted to testify as to the size of his family and as to the assist-
ance he received from them in his work. Held, that the admission of this
evidence constituted reversible error.
The fact that the injured party has a family dependent upon him is not
ordinarily admissible to enhance damages. Pittsburg, Ft. W. &- C. By. Co.
v. Powers, 74 Ill. 341; Louisville & N. fy. Co. v. Binion, 107 Ala. 645. Nor
is it competent for plaintiff to prove his pecuniary or social condition in gen-
eral. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pointer, 9 Kan. 620; Pa. Ry. Co. v. Books, 57
Pa. St. 339. In Moore v. City of Huntington, 31 W. Va. 842, it is held that
the verdict will not be set aside if there is other evidence sufficient to sustain
it. If the jury is properly charged as to the measure of damages, the admis-
sion of such testimony is not necessarily a cause for reversal. City of Kinsley
v. Morse, 40 Kan. 577; Central Pass. By. Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578. But the
instruction as to the measure of damages must be specific. Stefihens v. H.
&. St. J. fy. Co., 96 MO. 207. It is stated in Youngblood v. S. C., etc., Ry.
Co., 6o S. C. 9., that when incapacity to support family is a proximate result
of the injury, such evidence is admissible. And a similiar conclusion is
reached in San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 73 Tex. 277.
INJUNCTIONS-INTERLOCUTORY-REvIEW ON APPEAL.-N ORTHERN SEURITIES
Co. v. HARRIUAN ET AL., 134 FED. 331.-When the judge of a lower court, in
granting a preliminary injunction, was materially influenced by the consider-
ation that the questions involved were, as he viewed them, serious and doubt-
ful, and that an order denying the injunction would not be reversible upon
appeal. Held, that the rule that the appellate court will not interfere with
the exercise of the discretionary power of the court, unless it is abused, does
not apply, and the question will be determined on the merits. Gray, J., dis-
senting.
This case hardly seems consistent with former decisions. The granting
of a temporary injunction rests within the discretion of the court, Bu 9ington
v,. Harvey, 95 U. S. 99.; and this discretion will not be interfered with by a
higher court, Powell v. Howard, 81 Ga. 359; unless it clearly appears upon
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the record that it has been flagrantly abused. Parker v,. Green, 49 Ga. 624;
Roger v. Tennant, 45 Cal. X85. It is not an abuse of this discretion to grant
an injunction where there is a doubtful case, and the defendant might do acts
which would render a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff ineffectual.
Gloversville v.Johnstown Ry. Co., 66 Hun 627. It is an abuse to grant .an
interlocutory injunction where the complaint fails to state a cause of action
and is reviewable, McHenry v. Jewett, go N. Y. 58; unless a doubtful question
of law arises from the complaint, when the higher court should defer its de-
cision until a hearing upon the merits by the lower court. Selchow v. Baker,
93 N. Y. 5g.
NEGLIGENCE-HIGHWAYS-DANGEROUS CONDITION.-SHEPARD v. BELLOW &
MERRITT CO., gr N. Y. Supp. 999.-Held, that where contractors reconstruct-
ing a road had given notice to the public of the dangerous condition of the
road and plaintiff had actual notice of its condition by recent use, the con-
tractors are not liable for injury to plaintiff resulting from the use of the road
while in such condition. Chase and Houghton, JJ., dissenting.
A traveler upon the highway must use ordinary care to avoid injury.
Creamer v. R. Co., x56 Mass. 320; Chicago v. Bixby, 84 Ill. 82. Contributory
negligence is not conclusively established by the fact that the injured party
had previous knowledge of the highway defect. Evans v. Utica, 69 N. Y.
166; Mahoney v,. Metropolitan R. Co., xo4 Mass. 73. Nor by the fact that
injured party might have taken a better and safer part of the highway.
Aurora v. Hillman, 90 Ill. 61; Griffn z. Auburn, 58 N. H. 121. Contra,
Wilson v. Charlestown, 8 Alien 137. Nor by the fact that plaintiff could have
seen the defect, if he had looked. Merriam v. Phillifisburg, I58 Pa. 78.
Only those using the highway in the ordinary mode for travel can recover
damages. Taylor v,. Peckham, 8 R. 1. 349; McArthur v. Saginaw, 58 Mich.
357-
NUISANCE-PERCOLATION OF WATER.-SCHWARZENBACH.V. ELECTRIC WATER
POWER Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. I87.--Held, that where defendant had a license
from plaintiff to erect a dam and flood his land below the dam, defendant is
liable for overflow and percolation of water through the dam flooding other
land of plaintiff. Parker and Smith, JJ., dissenting.
A person erecting a dam is responsible for all injury caused by it at
ordinary stages of water, Angell, Water Courses, (7th Ed.), sec. 330 ; such
as drowning neighboring lands by percolation. Marsh v. Trullinger, 6 Ore.
356; Wilson v. New Bedford, lO8 Mass. 261. Also owners of a reservoir
which is not sufficiently protected against percolation are liable for injury
caused thereby. Monson v. Fuller, 5 Pick. 554; Snow V. Whitehead, L. R.
27 Ch. D. 588. "The American decisions plant the liability on the ground of
negligence in construction or in maintenance of dam or reservoir, Pixley v,.
Clark, 35 N. Y. 520; Mills v. County Commiss'rs, xo8 Mass. 363; whereas the
English courts hold that the owners are liable, though not negligent in con.
structing or maintaining such reservoir. Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. I Exch.
265; Smith v. Fletcher, L. R. 7. Exch. 305.
RAILROADS-TREESPASSERS-WANTON NEGLIGENCE.-REYBURN V. MO. PA;.
Ry. Co., 86 S. W. x74 (Mo.).-Held, that a railroad is liable for the death of a
trespasser walking on the track, when the trainmen must inevitably have seen
him, but did nothing to warn him of his danger.
The weight of authority seems to be that a trespasser cannot recover in the
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absence of wilful or wanton negligence. Bjornquist v. B. &- A. R. Co., 185
Mass. 130; Chicago T. T. R. Co. v. Gruss, 200 Ill. 195. In some jurisdictions,
however, a higher degree of care is required. McClanahan v. V. S. &-, R. Co.,
Iii La. 781; Corbett v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 25 Utah449. It is held in Nolan v. N.
Y., N. H. &- H. R. Co., 53 Conn. 46!, and Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co.,
66 Fed. r.5, that the railroad is under no obligations to make its track safe for
trespassers; while in the very recent case of Ashworth v. S. R. Co., 116 Ga.
635, it is stated that the railroad is not absolutely relieved from anticipating
their presence. But it is generally agreed that the railroad owes them no
duty until their peril is discovered. Johnson v. C., St. P., M. &- 0. Ry. Co.
123 Iowa 224; Goodman's Adm'r v,. L. & . N. B. Co.. 25 Ky. L. R. 1086.
It is necessary to show actual knowledge on the part of the railroad. Erie R.
Co. v. McCormick, 69 0. St. 45. A trespasser cannot complain of a failure to
give warning upon approach to a crossing, Davis' Adn'r v. C. &- 0. R. R.
Co., 25 Ky. L. R. 342; nor that the speed was in violation of a city ordinance.
Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Eicher, 202 Ill. 556. When, as in the present case,
there is an entire failure to warn, recovery is usually allowed. Mitchell v.B.
& M. R. R. Co., 68 N. H. 96; Central 2?. &' B. Co. v. Vaughan, 93 Ala.
209; contra, Hale v. C. &- G. Ry. Co., 34S. C. 292.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-EVIDENCE.-CHARLTON V. COLUMBIA REAL ESTATE
Co., 6 ATr. 192 (N. J.).-RHeld, that a signed but undelivered lease may be
given in evidence to prove an agreement upon the details of a lease pursuant
to one of the terms of a previously signed memorandum in writing of an oral
agreement for a lease; and if the previous memorandum of agreement for a
lease and the signed but undelivered lease, taken together, show a completed
agreement upon the terms of a lease, the statute of frauds is satisfied, and
specific performance may be decreed. Dixon, Garrison, Swayze and Gray,
JJ., dissenting.
A complete contract binding under the Statute of Frauds may be
gathered from letters, writings, telegrams, etc., between the parties, relating
to the subject matter of the contract, and so connected with each other that
they may fairly be said to constitute one paper relating to the contract.
Beckwith v. Talbot, 95 U. S. 289; Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H. L. Cas. 238.
But authorities disagree as to the operation of an undelivered deed, some
declaring such an instrument to be insufficient as a memorandum under the
statute. Freeland v. Charnley, 80 Ind. 132; Parker v. Parker, I Gray 409.
Others hold the contrary, provided the deed contain the terms of agreement.
Griel v. Lomax, 89 Ala. 42o; Thayer v. Luce, 22 Ohio 62. An undelivered
deed, however, may be read in connection with other documents to supply the
description of property. Leonard v. Woodruff, 23 Utah 494; Jenkins v.
Harrison, 66 Ala. 345.
TAXATION-TRANSFER-DEBTs-SITuS.-IN RE DALY'S EsTATE, 91 N. Y.
Supp. 858.-Held, that debts due within the state from solvent debtors, which
are converted into money therein and must of necessity be enforced in the
jurisdiction of the state, or not at all, are property within the state and are
taxable according to the transfer tax act (Laws i8g6, c. 908, § 220). Ingraham,
J., dissenting.
It is a general rule of law, based upon a legal fiction, that personal
property attends the owner and has its situs at his domicile. Preston v.
Boston, 12 Pick. 7; In re Euston's Will, 113 N. Y. 178. In modern times this
rule has yielded more and more to the law of the place where the property is
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kept and used. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; Wai wortk v. Harris, 129
U. S. 355. So, for purposes of taxation, personal property may be separated
from the owner, and he may be taxed on its account at the place where it is,
although not the place of his domicile. R. .. '. Penn. (State Tax on Foreign
held Bonds), 15 Wall. 300; In reRomaine's Estate, 127 N. Y. 8o. So the situs
of money on deposit in a bank has been held to be in the state where the de-
posit is. In re Romaine's Estate, supra ; State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495. And
the situs of a corporation may determine the situs of its stock, without re-
gard to the locality of the stock certificates. Young v. South Tredegar Iron
Co., 85 Tenn. i89. But the situs of a debt has long been held to be the domi-
cile of the creditor. Cooley, Tax., pp. 14, is; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, ioo U. S.
496. Such is the New York rule. in re Bronson, x5o N. Y. i. But a trans-
fer depends on the laws of the state, not because of any theoretical specu-
lation concerning the whereabouts of the debt, but because of the practical
fact of its power over the person of the debtor. R. R. v. Sturm, 174 U. S.
710; Blackstone v. Miller, i88 U. S. I8g.
TORTS-INFANTS-DAMAGES-EARNING PowzR.-Pozma v. DEL. L. & W.
R. Co., 134 FED. 155.-Held, that where in an action for injuries by an
unemancipated infant, it appeared that she would fully recover before she
became of age, she was not entitled to damages for loss of earning power.
In an action by a child against a railroad it may recover for diminished
earning powers after it becomes of age, Ft. Worth & D. C. By. Co. v.
Robertson, i4 L. R. A. 781; and the amount of damages it is to be allowed is
a question for the judgment and conscience of the jurors guided by circum-
stances. Rosencranz v. Lindell Ry. Co., 1o8 Mo. 9; but recovery cannot be
had by plaintiff for diminished capacity to earn during minority, for such
earnings belong to the father. Teo. &- P. By. Co. v. Morin, 66 Tex. 225.
It is error to instruct the jury that the infant's lessened earning power is an
element of damages, unless limited to the time from which the child would be
entitled to his own earnings. Chicago By. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889.
TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS--OPINION OF CoURT.-BIsHOp V. STATE, 84 S. W.
707 (Ax.).-After the jury had been out for some time they announced that
they could not agree, when the courtsaid: "I always have an opinion of the
facts of a case, but it is not my province to indicate my opinion to you. It is
your exclusive province to settle the fact, and mine to declare the law.
However, I will say that if you agree upon the defendant's guilt, and are not
able to agree upon the punishment, you may leave that to be fixed by me."
In a few minutes the jury found verdict of guilty. Held, that such state-
ment by the court was reversible error. Hill, C. J., and Riddick, J., dis-
senting.
The old common law rule that it is competent for a judge to give his
opinion of the weight of any part or the whole of the evidence in a cause being
tried before it, provided the ultimate decision of the facts be left to the jury,
is still followed in the English courts, the U. S. courts, and those of some
states. Belcher v. Prittie, 4 M. & Scott 295; Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. 89;
Church v. Rouse, 21 Conn. 167. But in most states this rule has been
changed by constitution or statute forbidding the court to express an
opinion as to the weight and sufficiency of evidence. The purpose is to keep
unimpaired the province of the jury. Muller v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 502;
Frame v. Badger, 79 M1. 441; Com. v. Larrabee, 99 Mass. 412.
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TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS-UNONTROVERTED FACTS.-TERRE HAUTE ELECTRIC
Co. v. KIELY, 72 N. E. 658 (IND.).-Held, that it is not error for the court to
assume, in its instruction, the existence of uncontroverted facts.
It has been held that the court cannot assume a fact even though
established by proof beyond controversy, Bal. &- Susquehanna R. R: Co.
v. Woodruff, 4 Md. 242; for it would be an invasion of the right of the jury.
Zoune v. Wierson, 3 Chand. 24o. But by the great weight of authority the
court may, in its instruction, assume facts which are uncontroverted, Ball
v. Mfonson, o Iowa 585; even though testified to by only one witness, First
Nat. Bank z'. Hatch, 98 Mo. 376; and such assumptions are not grounds for
reversal. Aooney v. York Iron Co., 82 Mich. 263.
